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LITIGATING FOR THE HOMELAND: 
AN INDIAN TREATY FRAMEWORK TO 





Climate change is an increasingly pressing issue on the world stage. The federal 
government, however, has largely declined to address any problems stemming from the effects 
of climate change, and litigation attempting to force the federal government to take action, as 
highlighted by Juliana v. United States, has largely failed. This Note presents the case for a 
class of plaintiffs more likely to succeed than youth plaintiffs in Juliana—federally recognized 
Indian tribes. Treaties between the United States and Indian nations are independent 
substantive sources of law that create enforceable obligations on the federal government. The 
United States maintains a trust relationship with federal Indian tribes, and that relationship 
obliges a duty of protection upon the federal government. This Note argues that those 
obligations may support climate change claims under the theory that the government, by failing 
to address climate change, has failed its duty of protection under its treaties. 
  
 
*  J.D. Candidate, University of Michigan Law School 2021. I am especially grateful to Marielle 
Coutrix, Jared Looper, and Caroline Leahy for their commentary and insightful critiques of this Note, and 
to the entire MJEAL staff for their tireless efforts in editing and cite-checking. I am particularly indebted 
to the Student Scholarship Workshop, specifically Professors Nina Mendelson, Rebecca Eisenberg, and 
Emily Prifogle, as well as my fellow students in the class, for their consistent feedback and support in 
writing and rewriting this Note. My hope is that this Note will bring attention to climate change, arguably 
the existential threat of our time, and will inspire people from all walks of life to take action to combat 
this pressing problem. 
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Scientists from around the world have declared that Earth “clearly and 
unequivocally faces a climate emergency.”1 Studies have suggested that 
anthropogenic climate change may lead to roughly 150 million people losing their 
homes, strong hurricanes obliterating coastal communities, and wildfires sweeping 
through large regions, and many other unthinkable tragedies.2 
Despite the enormity of the emergency, the United States government has 
declined to take any action on climate change. The government, particularly the 
Trump Administration, has instead opted to ignore climate change and even deny 
that it is a problem.3 Typically, the role of regulating climate change-inducing 
greenhouse gases would fall to the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), 
which possesses federal authority to regulate those gases under the Clean Air Act.4 
As the democratic process has broken down and failed to address climate change, 
some members of the public have taken to the courts in an attempt to spur federal 
 
1. Andrew Freedman, More than 11,000 scientists from around the world declare a ‘climate emergency,’ 
WASH. POST (Nov. 5, 2019, 10:18 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/science/2019/11/05/more-
than-scientists-around-world-declare-climate-emergency/?wpisrc=nl_todayworld&wpmm=1.  
2. See Denise Lu & Christopher Flavelle, Rising Seas Will Erase More Cities by 2050, New Research 
Shows, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/10/29/climate/coastal-
cities-underwater.html?wpisrc=nl_todayworld&wpmm=1; see also The Effects of Climate Change, NASA, 
https://climate.nasa.gov/effects/.  
3. For example, President Trump announced he would withdraw the United States from the 
Paris Agreement, a major international climate change agreement. See Brady Daniels, Trump Makes it 
Official: U.S. Will Withdraw from the Paris Climate Accord, WASH. POST (Nov. 4, 2019, 7:17 PM) 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2019/11/04/trump-makes-it-official-us-will-
withdraw-paris-climate-accord/?wpisrc=nl_todayworld&wpmm=1 (The Paris agreement set a global goal 
to limit the planet’s temperature rise to 2 degrees Celsius total.). 
4. The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401, et seq.  




action. In a particularly notable case, Juliana v. United States,5 a group of young 
plaintiffs sued the federal government, alleging that the government was actively 
violating their rights under both the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and the public trust doctrine.6 Juliana is perhaps the most famous 
example of plaintiffs using litigation to provoke a response to climate change. The 
case drew national attention7 but was subsequently dismissed by the Ninth Circuit 
on the grounds that the court lacked authority under the Constitution to prompt the 
federal government to take action.8 The legislature, not the judiciary, the court 
reasoned, is the proper forum in which to address climate change.9  
Though Juliana may have been dismissed, climate litigation is far from over. 
Where the Juliana plaintiffs failed, Indian tribes may be able to succeed.10 Substantial 
precedent under Indian treaties and the Indian Trust Doctrine suggests that Indian 
tribes can demand action from the federal government. When Indian tribes agreed 
to the treaties that resulted in the creation of their reservations, they were negotiating 
for a homeland. The federal government regularly promised to hold that homeland 
in trust and ensure it had the qualities to make it a livable place to call home.11 As 
climate change continues to affect the world around us, tribal land—and importantly, 
water—will be affected. If the federal government unrelentingly ignores climate 
change and discourages remediation efforts, it will diminish the livability of tribal 
reservations in violation of its treaties with many tribes.  
Precisely because they can compel government action through treaty 
obligations, Indian tribes are best situated to be the leading plaintiffs in the next 
stage of climate litigation. Even though tribal plaintiffs represent an untested 
strategy, the potential social impact of such litigation should not be understated. 
Climate lawsuits against the federal government brought by indigenous communities 
 
5. Juliana v. United States, 339 F. Supp. 3d 1062 (D. Or. 2018), mandamus denied, 140 S. Ct. 16 
(2019) [hereinafter Juliana II]. 
6. Id.  
7. See, e.g., Steve Kroft, The Climate Change Lawsuit That Could Stop the U.S. Government from 
Supporting Fossil Fuels, CBS NEWS (June 23, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/juliana-versus-united-
states-the-climate-change-lawsuit-that-could-stop-the-u-s-government-from-supporting-fossil-fuels-60-
minutes/.  
8. Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1165 (9th Cir. 2020) [hereinafter Juliana III]. 
9. Id. at 1165 (“[T]he plaintiffs’ impressive case for redress must be presented to the political 
branches of government.”). 
10. Throughout this Note, I refer to Native American tribes as “Indian” tribes since that is the 
term the U.S. Constitution and federal statutes employ. I do, however, recognize the historical inaccuracy 
of the term and recognize that Indian tribes are not a homogenous group and have a remarkably diverse 
range of cultures, languages, and ideologies. 
11. See, e.g., Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 565 (1908) (stating that the purpose of an 
Indian reservation is “to provide the Indians with a permanent home and abiding place”).  





would, at the very least, help bring attention to and advance the discussion around 
climate policy. 
This Note argues that federally recognized Indian tribes are 
underappreciated environmental plaintiffs who are best situated to spur climate 
action from the federal government due to the obligation the federal government 
owes tribes under the duty of protection. Part I explores the Indian Trust Doctrine 
as it relates to treaty rights to explain that the federal government has an obligation 
to preserve the homelands Indian tribes duly bargained for. Part II surveys the 
current scope of climate change litigation, using Juliana to demonstrate that current 
litigation strategies are inadequate largely due to a lack of enforcement mechanisms. 
Part III suggests that the government’s affirmative treaty obligations to Indian 
Tribes present a better opportunity for climate change litigation, arguing that courts 
should construe treaty rights broadly to encompass the duty to protect ecosystems 
and environmental resources on tribal reservations. That treaty-based framework, 
this Note contends, is a compelling legal strategy to move climate litigation forward. 
I. TREATIES AND TRUST 
A. Establishment of the Indian Trust Doctrine 
Tribal sovereignty has existed since long before the founding of the United 
States.12 Much of the Indian sovereignty jurisprudence was framed by Chief Justice 
John Marshall in the early nineteenth century in a series of cases known as the 
“Marshall Trilogy.” Marshall authored three opinions13 that have served as the 
foundation of federal Indian law and policy throughout the history of the United 
States and continue to be good law today. 14  
The single most important case for the recognition of tribal sovereignty is 
Johnson v. M’Intosh.15 In M’Intosh, Justice Marshall outlined what has come to be 
known as the “doctrine of discovery,” which stated that conquering European nations 
“had the sole right of acquiring soil from the natives.”16 While acknowledging that 
the sovereign rights of Indians were still extant, Justice Marshall reasoned that “their 
rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily diminished, 
and their power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever they pleased, 
was denied by the original fundamental principle, that discovery gave exclusive title 
 
12. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 3 (1831). 
13. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543 (1823); Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); 
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
14. See Mathew L.M. Fletcher, The Iron Cold of the Marshall Trilogy, 82 N.D. L. REV. 627, 627-28 
(2006). 
15. See Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543 (1823). 
16. Id. at 573. 




to those who made it.”17 Some of the European powers who “discovered” the tribes 
recognized the tribes’ inherent sovereignty by negotiating treaties with them.18 
Seven years after M’Intosh, Justice Marshall addressed whether Indian 
tribes were “foreign States” under the Constitution.19 Justice Marshall reasoned that 
tribes were neither “foreign states” nor among the “Several States” of the Union; 
indeed, they were something different altogether: “domestic dependent nations.”20 
As such, Indian tribes were sovereign, existing within the external boundaries of the 
United States yet dependent upon the federal government. They could be 
appropriately defined as “states,” however, since “[t]he numerous treaties made with 
them by the United States recognize[d] them as a people capable of maintaining the 
relations of peace and war, of being responsible in their political character for any 
violation of their engagements, or for any aggression committed on the citizens of 
the United States by any individual of their community.”21 Stressing their 
dependence on the United States for certain needs, Justice Marshall argued that the 
tribes’ relation to the United States “resemble[d] that of a ward to his guardian.”22 
This legal rationale is the framework upon which federal Indian law is still based. 
Notably, these cases established the principles of the trust relationship between the 
federal government and tribes.23  
The Indian Trust Doctrine has been described by Professor Mary C. Wood 
as “the purest moral foundation of the trust: the sacred promise, made to induce 
massive land cessions, that the retained homelands would be protected to support 
tribal lifeways and generations into the future.”24 In Seminole Nation v. United States, 
the Supreme Court articulated the duties of the United States to “charge[] itself with 
moral obligations of the highest responsibility and trust … Its conduct, as disclosed 
in the acts of those who represent it in dealings with the Indians,” the Court specified, 
“should therefore be judged by the most exacting fiduciary standards.”25 The trust 
 
17. Id. at 574 (emphasis added). 
18. See Hope M. Babcock, A Civic-Republican Vision of ‘Domestic Dependent Nations’ in the Twenty-
First Century: Tribal Sovereignty Re-envisioned, Reinvigorated, and Re-empowered, UTAH L. REV. 443, 457-
58 (2005).  
19. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831). 
20. Id. at 17. 
21. Id. at 16. 
22. Id. at 17.  
23. See generally COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 5.04(3) (Nell Jessup Newton 
ed., 2012).  
24. Mary C. Wood, Indian Trust Responsibility: Protecting Tribal Lands and Resources Through Claims 
of Injunctive Relief Against Federal Agencies, 39 TULSA L. REV. 355, 368 (2003). 
25. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942). 





relationship’s most important and substantive effect arises from treaties made with 
tribes under Article II of the Constitution. 
B. Treaties and the Duty of Protection 
When the original European conquerors and later American settlers made 
treaties with Indian tribes to take their land, tribes were negotiating for a homeland. 
In United States v. Winans, a staple of Indian treaty rights law, the Supreme Court 
explained that Indian reservations were created, at least in part, to reserve the right 
of Indians to hunt and fish.26 During negotiations for the Point–No–Point Treaty 
with the S'Klallam, the Chimakum, and the Skokomish tribes in Washington in the 
1850s, Governor Isaac Stevens told the tribes: “This paper [the treaty] is such as a 
man would give to his children and I will tell you why. This paper gives you a home. 
Does not a father give his children a home?”27 Employing the Indian Canon of 
Construction compelling courts to construe Indian Treaties liberally in favor of the 
tribes,28 the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Washington determined that the tribe 
was indeed bargaining for a place to live—a home.29  
Although the precise word “home” is not found in most treaties, it can be 
found in case law. The Ninth Circuit has noted that the “specific purposes of an 
Indian reservation, however, were often unarticulated. The general purpose, to 
provide a home for the Indians, is a broad one and must be liberally construed.”30 
This idea has deep, and enduring, roots. As early as 1908, the Supreme Court 
observed that the true purpose of an Indian reservation is “to provide the Indians 
with a permanent home and abiding place.”31  
Indian reservations are those lands carved out specifically for tribes as their 
homeland; they are places where they may retain their culture and resources.32 Indian 
tribes and the United States bargained for concessions later memorialized in 
 
26. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 378-89 (1905). 
27. Washington v. Wash. State Com. Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 667 n.11 
(1979) (emphasis added). 
28. See Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 199 (1975) (“The canon of construction applied over 
a century and a half by this Court is that the wording of treaties and statutes ratifying agreements with 
the Indians is not to be construed to their prejudice.” (citing Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 
582 (1832)); Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 684-85 (1942) (“It is our responsibility to see that the 
terms of the treaty are carried out, so far as possible . . . in a spirit which generously recognizes the full 
obligation of this nation to protect the [Indian] interests . . . .”).  
29. United States v. Washington, 827 F.3d 836, 851 (9th Cir. 2016), amended and superseded, 853 
F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2017). 
30. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 47 (9th Cir. 1981). 
31. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 565 (1908). 
32. See Wood, supra note 24. 




treaties.33 These treaty negotiations often involved unequal bargaining power and 
considerable language barriers, with the United States holding far more power than 
the tribes.34 When tribes conceded or lost their lands, they received some 
consideration in return: a promise to protect those lands.35 This treaty relationship 
created the so-called “duty of protection” under the trust relationship.36 Felix Cohen, 
the father of modern Federal Indian law, wrote: “[t]he promise of such protection 
for lands retained by the Indian tribes was an important quid pro quo in the process 
of treaty-making by which the United States acquired a vast public domain.”37 That 
duty is an essential part of the Indian Trust Doctrine and critical to this Note’s 
proposed litigation strategy. Treaty-based claims, bolstered by the Trust Doctrine, 
would support tribal climate litigation. 
The federal government recently reaffirmed its commitment to the duty of 
protection. In the Indian Trust Asset Reform Act of 2016,38 Congress found that 
“historic Federal-tribal relations and understandings have benefitted the people of 
the United States as a whole for centuries and have established enduring and 
enforceable Federal obligations to which the national honor has been committed.”39 
Congress also acknowledged in the Indian Trust Asset Reform Act that “the United 
States has undertaken a unique trust responsibility to protect and support Indian 
tribes and Indians.”40 That Act further asserts that “the fiduciary responsibilities of 
the United States to Indians also are founded in part on specific commitments made 
through written treaties . . . which provided legal consideration for permanent, 
ongoing performance of Federal trust duties…and have established enduring and 
enforceable Federal obligations.”41  
 
33. See, e.g., Treaty with the Navajo Tribe of Indians, 15 Stat. 667 (1868). 
34. See United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380 (1905) (justifying interpretation of treaty terms 
in favor of Indian tribes based on unequal bargaining power). 
35. See Washington v. Wash. State Com. Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 662 
(1979), modified sub nom,  Washington v. United States, 444 U.S. 816 (1979) (“[T]he Indians relinquished 
their interest in most of the Territory in exchange for monetary payments, certain relatively small parcels 
of land reserved for their exclusive use, and other guarantees, including protection of their ‘right of taking 
fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations . . . in common with all citizens of the Territory.’”). 
36. See Reid Peyton Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians, 27 
STAN. L. REV. 1213, 1224-27 (1975) (arguing that courts improperly treat the trust duty as “a moral 
obligation, without justiciable standards for its enforcement”). 
37. Nathan R. Margold, Introduction to FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 
vii, xii (1942). 
38. Pub. L. No. 114-178, 130 Stat. 432 (2016). 
39. 25 U.S.C. § 5601(5) (emphasis added). 
40. § 5601(3). 
41. §§ 5601(4)-(5). 





The Department of the Interior, the federal agency charged with the 
responsibility of Indian affairs, since at least 1978 has maintained the official position 
that the United States owes a fiduciary duty to Indian tribes “of care and loyalty, to 
make trust property income productive, to enforce reasonable claims on behalf of 
Indians, and to take affirmative action to preserve trust property.”42 Moreover, the 
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) has acknowledged its trust responsibility 
in official policy statements: the “EPA recognizes that a trust responsibility derives 
from the historical relationship between the Federal Government and Indian Tribes 
. . . . In keeping with that trust responsibility, the Agency will endeavor to protect 
the environmental interests of Indian Tribes when carrying out its responsibilities 
that may affect the reservations.”43 The Act’s language and the official policy stances 
of the federal agencies with direct responsibilities over tribal welfare reflect the 
federal government’s understanding that its duty to tribes is a long-standing doctrine 
with affirmative obligations.  
The Supreme Court held in Washington v. Washington State that Indian 
nations negotiated for the federal government to act in “good faith” to effectuate the 
duty of protection.44 In dicta, the Court reasoned that “[i]t is perfectly clear, however, 
that the Indians were vitally interested in protecting their [resources] . . . and that 
they were invited by the white negotiators to rely and in fact did rely heavily on the 
good faith of the United States to protect that right.”45 Treaties were the primary 
mechanism by which tribes bargained for that duty of protection in exchange for 
diminishing their lands for white settlement. 
Unfortunately for Indian tribes, the duty of protection has, until recently, 
been largely thrown by the wayside. Scholars have noted the duty has historically 
been treated as “essentially just a mere platitude”46 with limited, if any, enforceable 
legal power. The government’s ability to ignore its moral and legal obligations grew 
as the Supreme Court regularly deferred to the discretion of the federal government 
in deciding how to implement the duty of protection. In 1903, for instance, the Court 
held in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock that the Court would stay out of Indian affairs, 
reasoning (perhaps naïvely) that the United States would act in “good faith” to 
 
42. Letter from Leo Krulitz, Solicitor, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, to James W. Moorman, Asst. 
Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice 2 (Nov. 21, 1978). 
43. William D. Ruckelshaus, EPA Policy for the Administration of Environmental Programs on 
Indian Reservations 3 (Nov. 8, 1984), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-04/documents/in
dian-policy-84.pdf.  
44. Washington v. Wash. State Com. Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n., 443 U.S. 658, 667 (1979). 
45. Id. 
46 Daniel I.S.J. Rey-Bear & Matthew L.M. Fletcher, “We Need Protection from Our Protectors”: The 
Nature, Issues, and Future of the Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians, 6 MICH. J. ENV’T. & ADMIN. L. 397, 
399 (2017). 




effectuate its duty of protection and trust vis-à-vis Indian tribes.47 Today, courts 
remain hesitant to interfere with judgments of Congress which “can be tied rationally 
to the fulfillment of the obligation toward the Indians.”48 This discarding of the duty 
of protection has been disastrous for Indian tribes. Through most of the twentieth 
century,  the federal government often eliminated tribal lands without tribal consent 
and eliminated other aspects of tribal sovereignty, 49 such as the right to remain 
immune from public takings without just compensation.50  
While the historical realities would seem to make any climate change claim 
against the federal government fruitless, more recent trends should give tribes, and 
those looking for opportunities for environmental litigation, a sense of hope.51 
Though courts may still be reluctant to review government action, modern Supreme 
Court jurisprudence has suggested that courts should more carefully scrutinize 
legislative and federal administrative actions vis-à-vis tribes. For example, in United 
States v. Sioux Nation, the Court rejected Lone Wolf’s unquestioned “presumption of 
congressional good faith” and held that:  
 
[I]n every case where a taking of treaty-protected property is 
alleged, a reviewing court must recognize that tribal lands are 
subject to Congress' power to control and manage the tribe's 
affairs. But the court must also be cognizant that “this power to 
control and manage [is] not absolute. While extending to all 
appropriate measures for protecting and advancing the tribe, it [is] 
subject to limitations inhering in . . . a guardianship and to 
pertinent constitutional restrictions.52 
 
In other words, a reviewing court will not simply defer to the judgment of Congress 
in treaty disputes concerning property or diminishment of resources. A treaty-based 
climate change claim would encounter a similar lack of Congressional deference, as 
it would involve the diminishment of resources. Similarly, the Court today 
acknowledges “the undisputed existence of a general trust relationship between the 
 
47. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565-68 (1903). 
48. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974). 
49. See Rey-Bear & Fletcher, supra note 46, at 368-69.  
50 . Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 284-85 (1955) (holding that a tribe was 
not entitled to compensation for the taking by the federal government of tribal resources under the Fifth 
Amendment because the tribe did not own those resources).  
51. See, e.g., Indian Trust Asset Reform Act, 25 U.S.C. § 5601(3) (“Congress finds that . . . through 
treaties, statutes, and historical relations with Indian tribes, the United States has undertaken a unique 
trust responsibility to protect and support Indian tribes and Indians. . . .”). 
52. United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 415 (1980) (quoting United States v. 
Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 109-10 (1935)). 





United States and the Indian people.”53 A reviewing court should, in a treaty-rights 
claim, scrutinize federal action (or lack thereof) affecting treaty rights. These treaty 
rights directly give rise to the duty of protection under the Trust Doctrine. 
The United States’ duty of protection towards Indian tribes is in fact 
enforceable.54 The Eighth Circuit, for example, held that the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
and Indian Health Service has a duty to clean up dumps on Indian land, which is 
“buttressed by the existence of the general trust relationship between these agencies 
and the Tribe.”55 The Ninth Circuit also concluded that the federal government has 
a fiduciary relationship in the management of tribal mineral resources by “taking into 
account these specific, congressionally-imposed duties, and the long-standing, 
general trust relationship between the government and the Indians.”56 And, in a 
ruling with particularly important implications for treaty suits, the District Court for 
the Western District of Washington held that the federal government’s “fiduciary 
duty, rather than any express regulatory provision . . . mandates that the [Army 
Corps of Engineers] take treaty rights into consideration.”57 
Similarly, federal courts have relied on statutory and general trust duties 
(largely arising from treaties) to order the federal government to affirmatively act to 
fulfil its duty of protection to the land, resources, and water of Indian tribes. This is 
particularly important if tribes go to court to enforce duties to protect against climate 
change, as climate change will most obviously affect land, resources, and water. In 
1973, for instance, the District Court for the District of Columbia heard a challenge 
from the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians against a regulation promulgated by 
the Secretary of the Interior.58 The Tribe argued the regulation would negatively 
impact their water supply and therefore violate the duty of protection stemming from 
 
53. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983) [hereinafter Mitchell II]; see also United 
States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 176 (2011) (“We do not question ‘the undisputed existence 
of a general trust relationship between the United States and the Indian people.’”) (quoting Mitchell II, 
463 U.S. at 225); United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 474 n.3 (2003) (“We 
have recognized a general trust relationship since 1831.”). 
54. See, e.g., Jicarilla Apache Nation v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 726, 738 (2011) (“[The United 
States] would have this court blithely accept what so many courts have rejected—that for the breach of a 
fiduciary duty to be actionable in this court, that duty must be spelled out, in no uncertain terms, in a 
statute or regulation.”); White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. at 475-76 (affirming implied trust duty); 
Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Trump, 428 F. Supp. 3d 282, 294 (D. Montana 2019) (“The trust relationship 
between the United States and the Indian people imposes a fiduciary duty on the government when it 
conducts ‘any Federal government action which relates to Indian Tribes.’”) (quoting Nw. Sea Farms, Inc. 
v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 931 F. Supp. 1515, 1519-20 (W.D. Wash. 1996)). 
55. Blue Legs v. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 867 F.2d 1094, 1100 (8th Cir. 1989). 
56. Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes of the Fort Peck Indian Reservation v. Bd. of Oil and Gas 
Conservation of Montana, 792 F.2d 782, 794 (9th Cir. 1986). 
57. Nw. Sea Farms, Inc., 931 F. Supp. at 1520.  
58. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1973). 




its treaty with the United States.59 In ruling for the Tribe, the court held that the 
federal government, through the Secretary of the Interior, was “obliged to formulate 
a closely tailored regulation that would preserve water for the Tribe.”60 The court 
also found “the Secretary's action . . . defective and irrational because it fails to 
demonstrate an adequate recognition of his fiduciary duty to the Tribe.”61 A tribe 
suing for a failure to protect against an effect of climate change, then, could feasibly 
model their case after Pyramid Lake and produce evidence that some regulation (or 
lack thereof) contributed to water degradation from climate change. 
The Ninth Circuit further noted in 2005 that it reads the trust obligation 
“to extend to any federal government action,” and that the United States must “honor 
its trust obligation to Indians.”62 While not specifically environmental in nature, 
these cases demonstrate that federal courts are willing to compel the federal 
government to enforce affirmative obligations vis-à-vis tribes on the basis of treaty 
rights. 
C. Water, Winters, Winans, and Washington 
Perhaps the most pertinent trust obligation the United States has with 
Indian tribes concerns water rights. For its part, the federal government 
acknowledges it holds water rights in trust for tribes.63 And since the early 1900s, the 
Supreme Court has acknowledged and defended tribal rights to water based on 
express and implied treaty rights.64 
The seminal case addressing Indian water rights, United States v. Winans,65 
establishes the framework for an environmental suit arising under a treaty. In the 
early 1900s, the Winans brothers operated state-licensed fish wheels, designed to 
scoop as many fish as possible, on the Columbia River in Washington.66 The wheel 
disturbed the Yakima Tribe’s ancestral fishing territory by systematically capturing 
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huge quantities of fish and occupying significant land.67 Further, the Winans 
brothers prohibited the Yakima tribe from crossing their land, thus preventing the 
tribe from accessing traditional fishing places68 in violation of  tribal treaty 
guarantees to “the exclusive right of taking fish . . . at all usual and accustomed 
places.”69  
The United States government brought suit on behalf of the tribe. On 
appeal, the Supreme Court issued a statement now central to federal Indian law: “the 
treaty was not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of rights from them—a 
reservation of those [rights] not granted.”70 This established the “reserved rights 
doctrine,” under which tribes retain their original sovereign title until tribes 
affirmatively surrender them. As stipulated by their treaty, “the Indians were given 
a right in the land” and could use their traditional fishing spots since the land was 
granted to them.71 Importantly, the Court held that those rights date from “time 
immemorial.”72 
Three years later, the Supreme Court decided Winters v. United States.73 
Leading up to Winters, the Fort Belknap reservation in Montana’s territory had been 
gradually diminished by successive treaties throughout the late 1800s, until 
ultimately the 1888 Desert Land Act confined the reservation to just 1400 square 
miles.74 After Montana achieved statehood, the white defendants built dams on the 
channel and diverted water resources from the reservation.75 In response, the federal 
government then filed suit on behalf of the tribe.76 The Supreme Court decided that 
even though the Desert Land Act did not lay it out in explicit terms, the statute 
implicitly protected water in the Milk River for the tribe.77 Using similar reasoning as 
it did in developing the Winans Reserved Rights doctrine, the Court explained that 
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“the power of the Government to reserve the waters and exempt them from 
appropriation under state laws is not denied, and could not be . . . . That the 
Government did reserve them we have decided, and for a use that would necessarily 
continue through the years.”78 
The Winters decision recognized implied water rights, based on the idea that 
treaties implicitly contain the right to enough water to satisfy the purpose of the 
reservation. Winters rights apply federally and preempt state law. Winters rights are 
critically important to tribes, particularly in the West, where prior appropriation 
doctrine applies.79 In the West, the allocation of water rights largely depend on the 
priority date a given entity has. When determining priority, Winters rights derive 
from the date on which the reservation was created.80 Most importantly, this implied 
right to water could play a key role in climate change litigation as the changing 
climate affects the availability of water enough to affect the “purposes of the 
reservation,” including having a stable enough ecosystem to sustain fishing and 
hunting. This will be further analyzed in Part III. 
Courts have broadly construed their powers to enact remedies stemming 
from these implied water rights, including recently in United States v. Washington 
(“The Culvert Case”).81 Lower courts had found that numerous road culverts, small 
tunnels underneath roadways that divert water through the road’s foundation, had 
blocked salmon access to their habitat in violation of Indian treaties. In 2017, the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court injunction requiring Washington to repair and 
replace culverts restricting the passage of fish.82 The court interpreted the plaintiff 
tribes’ treaty right to “take fish” to include protection of fishery habitat from man-
made alterations.83 In construing the treaty in favor of the Indian tribes, the Ninth 
Circuit held that the tribes’ primary purpose for entering the treaties “was to secure 
a means of supporting themselves once the Treaties took effect.”84 Finding that the 
culverts disrupted the tribes’ ability to support themselves through fishing, the court 
held  that the state “has violated, and is continuing to violate, its obligation to the 
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Tribes under the Treaties.”85 Though the state was not a party to the original treaty, 
the court still found it had violated tribal rights. 
The Supreme Court affirmed without an opinion, leaving in place the order 
directing the State of Washington to replace state-owned culverts.86 The Ninth 
Circuit compelled the state to take costly action to remedy an environmental-based 
harm, something the same circuit court refused to do in Juliana.87 Ultimately, the 
tribes’ Article II treaties created an unalienable right to sufficient water, enforceable 
by a cause of action against the state government. Washington reaffirmed a Supreme 
Court holding nearly 40 years earlier that water rights are “implicitly secured to the 
Indians by treaties reserving land” and that these implicit rights could require “an 
apportionment to the Indians of enough water to meet their subsistence and 
cultivation needs.88 In line with Washington, the EPA updated its Human Health 
Water Quality Standards in 2016 to support “the interpretation of tribal fishing 
rights to include the right to sufficient water quality to effectuate the fishing right.”89 
These decisions confirm that treaty rights are an independent source of law 
that create environmental rights for Indian tribes and impose enforceable obligations 
on state and federal actors to protect those rights. Government agents negotiated 
Article II treaties with Indian tribes to cede land to the United States while also 
carving out a livable homeland for tribes. That right to a homeland is an independent 
substantive source of law, enforceable against the government under the Trust 
Doctrine. As Part III will explore, these rights suggest that Indian tribes may be the 
ideal candidates to advance climate litigation and demand accountability from the 
federal government, even where other plaintiffs have failed. 
II. THE PROBLEM WITH CURRENT CLIMATE LITIGATION 
 Plaintiffs seeking to hold the federal government accountable have 
unsuccessfully tried multiple approaches. This section summarizes the various 
attempts, discusses why they failed, and demonstrates why Indian tribes do not face 
the same roadblocks.  
A. The Death of Atmospheric Trust Litigation 
Current climate change litigation is inadequate to meet the urgency of the 
problem. The most high-profile case concerning climate litigation, Juliana v. United 
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States, was dismissed by the Ninth Circuit in 2020.90 Utilizing “atmospheric trust 
litigation,” a group of young plaintiffs aged eight to nineteen alleged that the federal 
government was violating their Fifth Amendment substantive due process rights. 91  
The plaintiffs asserted that the federal government, “[b]y their exercise of sovereign 
authority over our country's atmosphere and fossil fuel resources, permitted, 
encouraged, and otherwise enabled continued exploitation, production, and 
combustion of fossil fuels, . . . deliberately allow[ing] atmospheric [carbon 
dioxide] concentrations to escalate to levels unprecedented in human history[.]”92  
The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief ordering the federal government to 
cease permitting, authorizing, and subsidizing fossil fuels and instead move swiftly 
to phase out carbon dioxide emissions.93 They also asked the court to order the 
government to take such action as necessary to ensure that atmospheric CO2 is no 
more concentrated than 350 ppm by 2100, “including to develop a national plan to 
restore Earth's energy balance, and implement that national plan so as to stabilize the 
climate system.”94 These bold requests reflect the urgency the litigants felt was 
needed to address climate change since government gridlock impeded the action 
necessary to protect their rights.95  
While District Judge Aiken initially refused to dismiss the suit in an 
apparent win for the “atmospheric trust” litigants, the Ninth Circuit overturned her 
ruling.96 The Ninth Circuit “reluctantly” concluded that the relief plaintiffs sought 
was “beyond [their] constitutional power.”97 Although the majority agreed that “[t]he 
record left little basis for denying that climate change is occurring at an increasingly 
rapid pace,”98 the court ultimately determined that the case was not justiciable.99 
Central to their determination was that Article III courts are not the proper place to 
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adjudicate climate change.100 Because the court determined that neither the 
Constitution nor the Administrative Procedure Act provided grounds for redress, it 
held that there was no source of law to support the plaintiffs’ claim.101 
Atmospheric trust suits like Juliana have so far failed.102  Even Juliana, the 
most well-known of these suits, only achieved short-lived success.103 Federal courts 
have, on the whole, been unwilling to take sweeping steps to create new substantive 
rights to a healthy environment under the Constitution. The Third Circuit has held 
that “there is no constitutional right to a pollution-free environment.”104 The Fourth 
Circuit, similarly, has held that there is no constitutional right to a healthy 
environment,105 and the District Court for the Northern District of California ruled 
that there is no fundamental right to be free from climate change pollution.106  
B.  Current Inadequacies Under the Clean Air Act 
The Clean Air Act107 establishes a framework of cooperative federalism to 
regulate air quality. The Act grants states primary responsibility to ensure that they 
meet National Ambient Air Quality Standards (“NAAQS”).108 In the traditional 
cooperative federalism model, states must submit state implementation plans 
(“SIPs”) that outline how they plan to implement, maintain, and enforce the 
NAAQS.109 While this grants states a fair bit of power in environmental regulation, 
the SIPs must be approved by the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) before 
they may be federally enforced.110 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act extended 
to Indian tribes for the first time the authority previously granted only to states.111 
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Those amendments specified that Indian nations may submit tribal implementation 
plans (“TIPs”) “applicable to all areas . . . located within the exterior boundaries of 
the reservation.”112 The Act granted EPA the authority to “treat Indian tribes as 
States” if they meet certain enumerated criteria.113  The Clean Air Act continues to 
be the only federal statute courts recognize as addressing air pollution.114 
Like states, tribes have been divested of significant authority under the 
EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, largely sacrificing that power to the 
federal government.115 The Clean Air Act, however, grants tribes and states certain 
avenues to opt to regulate their air more stringently than the statute requires. For 
example, EPA regulations allow both tribes and states to re-designate their territory 
into a more protective category under the Act to improve air quality.116 The EPA 
maintains a trust responsibility to “ensure the protection of air quality throughout 
the nation, including throughout Indian country.”117 Tribes are still heavily reliant on 
federal regulation for their welfare, though. The TIPs, while created by the tribes 
themselves, are still subject to EPA approval.118 
The Clean Air Act’s overall failure to address climate change is the primary 
driver of most climate litigation; interestingly, the Clean Air Act itself has been the 
death blow to those suits. An example of this tension is the 2011 Supreme Court 
decision American Electric Power Company v. Connecticut (“AEP”). In that case  the 
plaintiffs argued that AEP contributed to global warming by emitting CO2 and 
therefore substantially and unreasonably interfered with public rights in violation of 
the federal common law of interstate nuisance.119 The Court ruled for the defendants, 
holding that the Clean Air Act displaced any federal common law claims seeking 
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injunctions against emissions of carbon dioxide since the Act was the exclusive federal 
law governing air pollution.120  
The Ninth Circuit extended AEP’s reasoning to damages claims in 2012, 
holding that a small Alaskan tribe could not sue ExxonMobil, a fossil fuel producer, 
for monetary damages under a federal common law public nuisance claim stemming 
from the effects of climate change.121 The plaintiff in that case, the Native Village of 
Kivalina, sought monetary damages rather than injunctive relief against private 
defendants.122 Kivalina is located on the tip of a barrier reef on the northwest coast 
of Alaska.123 The city has long been home to members of the Village of Kivalina, a 
self-governing, federally recognized tribe of Inupiat Native Alaskans.124 Storms, 
rising sea levels and the deterioration of ice walls resulting from climate change have 
threatened the very existence of the city, and the tribe is seeking to relocate its village 
as a result.125 The tribe attempted to sue under a federal public nuisance theory, only 
to have that theory be displaced by the Clean Air Act.126 While some authority 
suggests that plaintiffs may have cognizable air pollution claims under state law,127 
tribes are more limited to federal remedies since state law typically has no force in 
Indian country, barring an express Congressional exception.128  
Climate litigation has, on the whole, been unsuccessful for plaintiffs seeking 
redress against the federal government or greenhouse gas producers for the effects of 
climate change.129  
Indian tribes do not face these same problems. Treaties arise under Article 
II of the Constitution and, bolstered by the Supremacy Clause, are the “supreme Law 
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of the Land.”130 Treaties are independent sources of law and contain explicit and 
implied rights to protect the bargained-for homeland.131 Tribes suing under treaty 
rights would not have to identify an independent Constitutional or APA claim 
against the government, as the Juliana plaintiffs tried and failed to do.132 Tribes 
would not need to go to court and request the creation of an additional constitutional 
right or proceed under a unique public trust theory. Article III courts have 
determined treaty rights concerning environmental rights to be justiciable in the 
past.133 Thus, tribes are uniquely situated to engage in impact climate litigation. 
III. A TREATY-BASED REFORM 
Winters and Winans establish a tribal right to a homeland. These homelands, 
however, are becoming less livable because of climate change: tributaries in the West 
are drying up and wild fires are spreading.134 The Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change found that American Indian Tribes are disproportionately 
vulnerable to climate change.135 That report concluded that “[i]ndigenous peoples are 
among the first to face the direct consequences of climate change, owing to their 
dependence upon, and close relationship with the environment and its resources.”136 
Indeed, tribes have already felt the effects of climate change and may be inclined to 
pursue a climate litigation strategy. Take the Native Village of Kivalina, for instance. 
Their home is directly under threat from climate change.137 As the United Nations 
reports suggest, there will likely be other tribes faced with similar challenges, making 
litigation a near necessity for many tribes living under a dismissive federal regime. 
Although tribes may be reluctant to go to court and risk setting bad precedent, the 
urgency of the issue for tribes and the global population at large coupled with the 
existence of favorable precedent and the potential for social impact may offset such 
concerns. 
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Treaty cases are best read to suggest that treaties include an implied right 
to preserved aquatic ecosystems (at least enough to maintain the purposes of the 
reservation) and to compel government action to protect them, as well as act on the 
effects of climate change.138  
Treaty rights expressly and impliedly include rights to a home and 
resources. These treaties have compelled government action before and should do so 
again in the climate change context. In United States v. Adair, the Ninth Circuit found 
two primary purposes for establishing the reservation: the promise of a homeland to 
maintain an agrarian society and the preservation of the tribe’s access to fishing 
grounds.139 The Wyoming Supreme Court held that the purpose of the Wind River 
Reservation in its state was to create a permanent homeland for the Indian nation, 
which included an intent to reserve water.140 In the Culvert Case, the Ninth Circuit—
affirmed by the Supreme Court—ordered a government actor to spend billions of 
dollars to preserve a tribe’s rights to fish, which included a right to enough 
unobstructed water to maintain a salmon habitat.141  
Winters and subsequent cases have held that reservations for Indian tribes 
reserved rights to enough water to make those lands productive. As climate change 
continues to dry up rivers and affect water levels, Indian tribes may have claims 
against the federal government for failing to meet its treaty obligations. The treaties 
create a duty of protection, and tribes may argue the government has failed to uphold 
that duty in declining to act and instead willfully ignoring the effects of climate 
change. If a court could order an injunction against the state of Washington for 
interfering with a tribe’s access to its treaty-guaranteed water right, why could a court 
not order the federal (or state) government to take action against proven effects of 
climate change that interfere with a tribe’s right to water? It is not difficult to imagine 
that a tribe might show that climate change has, for example, dried up a river affecting 
salmon migration. Indeed, studies have already suggested that climate change is 
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negatively impacting salmon habitats.142 In Juliana the Ninth Circuit accepted that 
climate change was a real phenomenon, stating “[t]he record leaves little basis for 
denying that climate change is occurring at an increasingly rapid pace . . . The record 
also conclusively establishes that the federal government has long understood the 
risks of fossil fuel use and increasing carbon dioxide emissions.”143 With that factual 
background accepted by the court, Juliana may have paved the way for Indian tribes, 
particularly those located in the Ninth Circuit’s geographic region, to bring climate 
claims under treaty rights. 
At least one federal court has stated that “[t]he trust relationship between 
the United States and the Indian people imposes a fiduciary duty on the government 
when it conducts ‘any Federal government action which relates to 
Indian Tribes.’”144 It is important to note, however, that the trust obligation by itself 
is not universally viewed as possessing such great power. Treaties, on the other hand, 
should impose affirmative obligations on federal agencies when treaty rights are 
implicated. If the federal government interferes with a tribe’s treaty rights and fails 
in its attendant duty of protection, the tribe may have a cognizable claim to force the 
federal government to take action to mitigate its treaty violation.   
Justice Gorsuch, writing for the majority in the recent case of McGirt v. 
Oklahoma, recognized the importance of treaties for providing “a permanent home” 
to the Creek Nation and “hold[ing] the government to its word.”145 In that case, the 
Court suggested that governments may not simply cite that “the price is too great” 
for courts to enforce treaty obligations.146 In declaring that most of Eastern 
Oklahoma is in fact an Indian Reservation, the Court importantly demonstrated its 
willingness to make consequential decisions in Indian law that could force massive 
systemic changes.147 This may indicate that the modern Supreme Court has at least 
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one justice—a notably conservative one at that—willing to interpret treaties liberally 
in climate change litigation.148   
Litigants should argue that the duty of protection arising from treaty rights 
encompasses the duty to protect ecosystems and environmental resources. Indian 
reservations are those lands carved out specifically for tribes as their homeland. They 
are places where they may retain their culture and resources—including water, air, 
and land. Tribal members often express a particular affinity for environmental 
stewardship representing their culturally-embedded relationship with the land.149 
Many tribes believe they were spiritually appointed as stewards of the world.150 
Tribes have fought for the right to protect their homelands, however small a piece 
they could wrangle from the federal government’s grasp. Those homelands are often 
held by the government in trust, with a fiduciary duty to protect and maintain them 
for the benefit of the tribe. As Winters, Winans, Washington and other cases suggest, 
treaties impose a general duty of protection on the United States to preserve the 
reservation ecosystem bargained for by tribes. Climate change is profoundly 
compromising that ecosystem. Litigants should argue that courts must construe 
Indian treaties liberally (as the Indian Canons of Construction already require) to 
include an implied right to a stable ecosystem beyond the previously recognized right 
to appropriate water resources. 151 Indeed, the Indian Canons of Construction compel 
courts to read treaties to “see that the terms of the treaty are carried out, so far as 
possible . . . in a spirit which generously recognizes the full obligation of this nation 
to protect the [Indian] interests.”152 Treaties already protect water on reservations, 
and as that water becomes affected by climate change, resulting in excess flooding 
and droughts, courts should use Indian treaties as substantive sources of law to hold 
the United States accountable for its end of those agreements.  
Take the Stevens treaty at issue in United States v. Washington. That treaty 
protects the right to enough water to preserve the purposes of the reservation. If 
rivers and tributaries were to dry up as a result of climate change (and the tribe could 
prove it), they could arguably sue the federal government. The tribe would argue 
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194, 199 (1975) (“The canon of construction applied over a century and a half by this Court is that the 
wording of treaties and statutes ratifying agreements with the Indians is not to be construed to their 
prejudice.”). 




that they signed a treaty with the intent to preserve enough water to sustain their 
homeland, and the federal government, by failing to take action to address climate 
change, violated that treaty. The claim would give rise to potential injunctions, like 
in Washington, that could require the government to implement environmental 
impact reviews or divert more water to tribal land. While a claim could not 
realistically force the government to establish a nationwide climate change response 
plan, it could require the government to take particular, discrete actions to assess 
climate impact on the plaintiff tribes’ reservation and, at the very least, provide the 
tribe with more resources to mitigate the impact. 
While it may seem a stretch to go from fishing rights in a treaty to forcing 
the federal government to take action to address a global problem, a suit of this nature 
could have a profound social impact. Litigation designed to advance social 
awareness—impact litigation—has benefits even if the merits of the lawsuit are 
uncertain. Just like Juliana enhanced social awareness of climate change,153 a treaty-
based claim from an Indian tribe would similarly build momentum for change in the 
courts and in federal policy circles more generally. Whether or not they ultimately 
succeed on the merits, such lawsuits are at the very least tools of impact litigation 
that could help mobilize social consciousness surrounding climate change. 
A. Counterarguments  
The primary obstacle in trust claims stemming from treaties is likely the 
lack of express statutory obligations imposed on the federal government. The 
holdings in two Supreme Court cases, United States v. Mitchell (“Mitchell I”)154 and its 
successor, United States v. Mitchell (“Mitchell II”),155 present obstacles to tribes seeking 
to sue under common law claims arising from treaty obligations. Nonetheless, these 
cases are not dispositive. The two Mitchell cases have been described by the Supreme 
Court as “pathmarking precedents on the question whether a statute or regulation 
(or combination thereof) can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the 
Federal Government.”156 The cases concern the Indian Tucker Act, a jurisdictional 
statute dictating how Indian tribes may sue the federal government for money 
damages.157 The Mitchell cases hold that, to receive such compensation, a tribe must 
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identify a substantive source of law that establishes specific duties, and allege that 
the federal government has failed to faithfully perform those duties.158 Typically, that 
would include locating a specific statutory provision that the government is alleged 
to have violated.159  
However, Mitchell and its progeny do not address whether an Indian tribe 
can state a claim for breach of trust related to treaty obligations. Substantive rights 
can be “found in some other source of law, such as the Constitution, or any Act of 
Congress, or any regulation of an executive department.”160 Treaties, as “acts of 
Congress,” fit into that description. Under the Constitution’s Article II Treaty 
Clause161 and the Supremacy Clause,162 treaties are particularly powerful sources of 
law—indeed, the “supreme law of the land.”163 As Justice Sotomayor has noted, the 
Supreme Court “[has] never held that all of the Government’s trust responsibilities 
to Indians must be set forth expressly in a specific statute or regulation.”164 Instead, 
the Court has “settled precedent that looks to common-law trust principles to define 
the scope of the Government’s fiduciary obligations to Indian tribes.”165   
Moreover, the Mitchell line of cases has even less relevance to treaty claims 
that are not seeking money damages but instead just declaratory and injunctive relief. 
The Indian Tucker Act is merely a jurisdictional provision that operates to waive 
sovereign immunity for claims premised upon other sources of law.166  It does not 
govern suits alleging treaty violations. Treaties are independent and enforceable 
sources of law that reserve rights, even when they are implied,167 and demand the 
duty of protection. That there is no specific statutory mandate obligating the federal 
government to maintain an Indian tribe’s ecosystem should not bar litigation by 
Indian tribes. Tribal treaties carry their own force of law and can obligate the federal 
government to act under the duty of protection. 
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 Climate litigation on the whole has been unsatisfactory for environmental 
plaintiffs. Courts have been reluctant to order the federal government to take action. 
Indian tribes often have Article II treaties, cognizable under the Constitution, as 
independent sources of law compelling a duty of protection upon the federal 
government. Federal Indian law already establishes that treaties create implied rights 
to water and fishing spots on reservations, and federal courts have used those rights 
to enforce affirmative obligations on government actors. As climate change litigation 
presses forward, Indian tribes are ideal plaintiffs to sue under a treaty-based 
framework to demand accountability from the federal government. In turn, courts 
should liberally construe treaties to include a duty of protection from the government 
obliging it to preserve a reservation’s water and ecosystem—including ameliorating 
deterioration from climate change. 
 
 
